Abstract. We show a formal duality between certain equilibrium concepts, including the correlated and coarse correlated equilibrium, and analysis frameworks for proving bounds on the price of anarchy for such concepts. Our first application of this duality is a characterization of the set of distributions over game outcomes to which "smoothness bounds" always apply. This set is a natural and strict generalization of the coarse correlated equilibria of the game. Second, we derive a refined definition of smoothness that is specifically tailored for coarse correlated equilibria and can be used to give improved POA bounds for such equilibria.
This paper shows a precise duality between certain equilibrium concepts, including correlated and coarse correlated equilibria, and analysis frameworks for proving POA bounds for such concepts. This duality makes formal the intuitive trade-off between the plausibility of the rationality assumptions imposed on the game participants and the quality of the corresponding worst-case approximation bound. We offer two applications.
1. Roughgarden [11] showed that every POA bound proved using a "smoothness argument" (see Definition 1) -the most frequently employed method for establishing POA bounds (e.g. [5, 6, 9, 10, 12] ) -applies automatically to (at least) all CCE of the game. A basic problem is to characterize the distributions over outcomes to which smoothness bounds always apply. We solve this problem (Theorem 1) and show that the answer is a generalization of CCE in which the average regret of players is non-positive, as opposed to the CCE condition that every player has non-positive regret (see Definition 2). 2. Applying the duality result in the opposite direction yields analysis frameworks that are guaranteed to be tight for the corresponding equilibrium concepts. We illustrate this idea with the set of CCE, where the corresponding multi-parameter analysis framework refines the simpler two-parameter smoothness paradigm in [11] . This more flexible analysis framework is, by definition, specifically tailored for CCE and can be used to give improved POA bounds for such equilibria.
The Primal-Dual Framework
Section 2.1 reviews standard definitions of cost-minimization games, equilibrium concepts, and the price of anarchy. Section 2.2 presents our first contribution and shows that, for every equilibrium concept that can be expressed as the probability distributions over outcomes that are solutions to a set of homogeneous inequalities, there is a corresponding analysis framework that is guaranteed to prove tight bounds on the price of anarchy for that concept. Our second contribution, described in Section 2.3, is an application of this framework: POA bounds proved using the "smoothness paradigm" introduced in [11] apply precisely to a generalization of coarse correlated equilibria that we call "average coarse correlated equilibria". Section 2.4 demonstrates how a sharper analysis method tailored specifically for coarse correlated equilibria, which follows directly from our primal-dual framework, can be used to prove bounds superior to those that follow from the standard smoothness paradigm.
Preliminaries
Cost-minimization games. We denote a cost-minimization game by a tuple Γ = (N, {S i } i∈N , {C i } i∈N ), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of n players, S i is the set of actions of player i, and c i : S → R ++ is player's i positive cost function, where S = S 1 × S 2 × · · · × S n is the joint action set. 1 We use ∆(S) to denote the set of probability distributions over S and s −i to denote the strategies played in s by the players other than i.
Equilibrium concepts and the price of anarchy. In this paper, we consider equilibrium concepts that can be described as subsets of ∆(S). In particular, recall that a correlated equilibrium (CE) is a joint probability distribution σ over outcomes of Γ with the property that
for every i and s i , s i ∈ S i . Thus a distribution σ over outcomes is a CE if the following holds for a random sample s ∼ σ: for each player i and "recommended strategy" s i , the player minimizes its expected cost, conditioned on the recommendation s i and assuming that other players play according to s −i , by playing s i . CE are also the limits of sequences of repeated play in which each player has vanishing per-step swap or internal regret (see [4] ). The mixed Nash equilibria of a game are precisely the CE that are also product distributions. A coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) is a joint probability distribution σ over outcomes of Γ with the property that
] for every i and s i ∈ S i . These equilibrium constraints consider only player deviations that are independent of the recommendation s i , so every CE is also a CCE (and, generally, the converse fails). CCE are also the limits of sequences of repeated play in which each player has vanishing per-step external regret (see [4] ).
We assume that the objective function is to minimize the total cost C(s) = i∈N C i (s), and use s * to denote an optimal outcome. The price of anarchy (POA) of a game for an equilibrium concept EQ ⊆ ∆(S) is the ratio between the expected total cost of the worst (i.e., highest-cost) equilibrium σ ∈ EQ and the social cost of s * .
A Primal-Dual Framework for POA Bounds
This section describes our primal-dual framework, which formalizes a duality between equilibrium concepts that can be represented as solutions of homogeneous inequalities and analysis methods that are necessary and sufficient to prove tight bounds on the POA for such concepts. Fix a game Γ , and an equilibrium concept EQ that can be written as EQ = {σ ∈ ∆(S) : Aσ ≤ 0}, where A ∈ R |S|×m is a matrix that can depend on players' cost functions in Γ . For example, the equilibrium concepts CE and and CCE can be described in this way:
Example 1 (Correlated Equilibria). We can express the CE of a cost-minimization game as the probability distributions over outcomes that satisfy CE = σ :
Example 2 (Coarse Correlated Equilibrium). We can express the CCE of a costminimization game as the probability distributions that satisfy CCE = σ : s σ s (C(s i , s −i ) − C(s)) ≤ 0, for every i ∈ N, and s i ∈ S i , σ s ≥ 0 .
A third example will arise naturally in Section 2.3.
We now develop our simple primal-dual framework. We can formally write the POA of a game Γ and an equilibrium concept EQ as
After scaling by C(s * ), this maximization problem can be expressed as the solution of the following linear program:
The dual problem of PRIMAL-EQ is DUAL-EQ : Minimize p subject to C(s
where 1 n is the n dimensional vector with all entries 1, and m is the number of inequalities in A.
We say that a game is p-bounded for the equilibrium concept EQ if there exists a vector z ∈ R m such that the pair (p, z) is feasible for DUAL-EQ, or simply p-bounded when the equilibrium concept is clear. We refer to z as a dual certificate for Γ and EQ.
Strong linear programming duality immediately implies the following.
Proposition 1.
For every cost-minimization game Γ and equilibrium concept EQ representable as the solution of homogeneous inequalities, POA EQ (Γ) ≤ p if and only if Γ is p-bounded for EQ.
The following example instantiates Proposition 1 for correlated equilibria. The next two sections provide further examples.
Example 3 (Primal-Dual Framework for Correlated Equilibria). For a cost-minimization game Γ , the quantity POA CE (Γ) is, by definition, the optimal solution to the problem PRIMAL-CE:
The corresponding DUAL-CE problem is then DUAL-CE : Minimize p subject to pC(s
Hence, to prove an upper bound of p on the POA for correlated equilibrium, it suffices to show that the game is p-bounded for CE -that is, to find a dual certificate z = {z i a,b } i∈N,a,b∈Si so that (p, z) is feasible for DUAL-CE.
The Limits of (λ, µ)-Smoothness
Roughgarden [11] defined a smooth game as follows.
Definition 1 (Smooth Games
for every outcome s.
One of the main results in [11] is that POA CCE (Γ) ≤ λ/(1 − µ) whenever Γ is (λ, µ)-smooth. 2 In addition, many known POA bounds -often stated only for pure or mixed Nash equilibria -are or can be recast as smoothness bounds (see [11] ), and thus these bounds "extend automatically" to the more general concept of CCE.
This section addresses the basic question of characterizing the distributions over outcomes to which a (λ, µ)-smoothness bound applies. The answer, which we derive via the primal-dual framework in the previous section, turns out to be a strict generalization of CCE that we call an average coarse correlated equilibrium, with respect to s * (ACCE * ).
Definition 2 (ACCE * ). For a fixed game and an outcome r ∈ S
When r is the minimum-cost outcome s * , we abbreviate ACCE s * by ACCE * .
Conceptually, there are two differences between a CCE and an ACCE * . In a CCE, the expected cost incurred by a player is at most that of unconditionally deviating to an any fixed action -i.e., every player has non-positive "regret". ACCE * is a more permissive equilibrium concept. First, we measure the regret of a player i by comparing its expected cost only to that incurred under a deviation to s * i , rather than to an arbitrary (or best) strategy. Second, in an ACCE * , some players i can have negative regret with respect to s * i as long as the average (over players) such regret is non-positive. Unsurprisingly, many games have ACCE * that are not CCE; the proof of Proposition 2 provides one concrete example.
The next theorem shows that every (λ, µ)-smoothness argument bounds the worst-case expected cost of precisely the set of ACCE * . This characterization has both positive and negative implications. First, even the ACCE * distributions of a (λ, µ)-smooth game have good expected cost (and not only the CCE, as proved in [11] ). Second, conversely, the worst-case ACCE * constrains the best-possible upper bound that can be proved via a (λ, µ)-smoothness argument.
Theorem 1 (Duality Between (λ, µ)-Smoothness and ACCE * ). For every cost-minimization game Γ , the best smoothness upper bound for Γ equals its POA for the equilibrium concept ACCE * :
inf λ 1 − µ : (λ, µ) s.t. the game Γ is (λ, µ)-smooth = POA ACCE * (Γ).
Proof. We prove that the (λ, µ)-smoothness requirements are equivalent to the constraints of the DUAL problem for the equilibrium concept ACCE * . We consider the linear fractional problem for obtaining the best (i.e., least) upper bound using (λ, µ)-smoothness: 
